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Fragmentation of international 
climate policy – doom or boon 
for carbon markets?
Abstract
After Copenhagen and Cancun, fragmentation of 
carbon markets is in full swing, with the EU and 
Japan actively dismantling the role of the CDM 
as “gold standard” currency of the global carbon 
market  While some political scientists argue that 
fragmentation could be advantageous for the 
climate negotiations, economists see it nega-
tively, as it drives mitigation costs upwards and 
leads to a hodgepodge of rules with high transac-
tion costs  The voluntary market as a laboratory 
for fragmentation has shown that high-quality 
credits are restricted to a tiny share, prices vary 
by several orders of magnitude and registries as 
well as verification standards have proliferated  
Thus fragmentation should be resisted as far as 
possible 
 
The rise and fall of centralized  
international climate policy
Anthropogenic global climate change is one of the 
biggest challenges for mankind entering the 21st 
century due to its particularly “nasty” policy char-
acteristics. Mitigation of greenhouse gases has the 
character of a global public good whose benefits ac-
crue to everybody while costs have to be borne by 
the entity financing the mitigation activity. In con-
trast to other public goods such as public security, 
benefits from climate change mitigation do not ac-
crue immediately, but only in the future, and the 
level of benefits is contested. For some actors, e.g. 
people living in high latitudes where climate change 
increases agricultural productivity (see Yang et al. 
2007), mitigation of climate change might actually 
not be desirable. Moreover, given the uncertainty 
surrounding climate change impacts, people might 
prefer to “wait and see”, and eventually call for gov-
ernment help if impacts actually occur. 
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After two decades of increasing visibility and sali-
ence, international climate policy is at a crossroads. 
Hitherto, climate policy had followed a path of in-
creasing centralization and coordination, climbing 
up a ladder of increasingly detailed international 
agreements. Climate negotiators had the general 
impression to follow in the footsteps of ozone di-
plomacy, where a generic framework treaty was 
strengthened over time by specific treaties, ratchet-
ing up emissions commitments as well as resource 
transfers from industrialized to developing coun-
tries to fund emissions mitigation. With the UN 
Framework Convention of Climate Change agreed 
in 1992, the Kyoto Protocol negotiated in 1997 and 
the Bali Plan of Action agreed in 2007 on the prin-
ciples of a post-2012 climate regime, the Montreal 
Protocol precedent seemed to be a perfect fit.
Of course, game theorists (Barrett 1998) and po-
litical science realists (Victor 2001) had long stated 
that the free riding induced by the global public 
good characteristics of climate policy would lead 
to a failure of a centralized international approach. 
They had seemed to triumph already in 2001 when 
US president Bush repudiated the Kyoto Protocol. 
But then the rest of the world rallied to defend 
the Kyoto approach, and the Protocol entered into 
force in 2005. 2007 brought the consecration of 
climate policy as an issue of highest global impor-
tance with the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and Al 
Gore. Everything seemed on track to culminate in a 
glorious event that would lead international climate 
policy in its third decade and set up a really global 
climate regime – the Copenhagen climate summit 
of late 2009. 
But fate intervened by unravelling the real estate 
bubble in the US. By mid-2009 policymakers in 
countries previously proud of their role as climate 
policy pioneers were struggling to keep their econo-
mies afloat. Hopes of the US playing the role of a 
climate policy frontrunner evaporated after Con-
gress failed to pass a comprehensive emissions 
trading bill. Those advanced developing countries 
that had weathered the storm well were not really 
eager to take up the role of greenhouse gas miti-
gation pioneers. Instead, they discovered climate 
policy as a field where they could assert their newly 
won economic power and defy industrialized coun-
tries through a new negotiation group called BASIC. 
This explosive cocktail derailed the Copenhagen 
negotiations, with things made worse by the host 
country’s inept handling of the summit. What was 
hoped to be the herald of a new era of global co-
operation on climate change mitigation dissolved 
into a glimpse into the abyss of a fragmented cli-
mate policy with each country just doing what it 
felt to be appropriate, without any comparabil-
ity or transparency of mitigation efforts. While 
through last minute attempts the abyss was pa-
pered over by the “Copenhagen Accord”, it became 
quickly visible that Copenhagen heralded a sea 
change in climate policy. Ever since then, interna-
tional climate policy faces the inconvenient truth 
of fragmentation, even if hidden behind many 
smokescreens of UNFCCC language and “success-
es” in negotiations such as Cancun in 2010. 
Why fragmentation of climate policy  
is a bad idea
Biermann et al. (2007, p. 8ff) discuss pros and 
cons of fragmentation from a political science 
view. In their view, fragmentation could lead to 
faster agreements among frontrunners and avoid 
watering down of commitments. Moreover, it 
would allow side payments and allow to involve 
non-state actors as well as solutions tailored to 
specific circumstances. Competition between dif-
ferent approaches could lead to innovation. Os-
trom (2010) argues that bottom-up “polycentric 
efforts” could lead to a situation that is better than 
an ineffective centralized regime. However, many 
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of the arguments do not fully fit to the current 
regime, as it allows for differentiation of commit-
ments, side payments through climate finance and 
voluntary non-state action. According to Biermann 
et al. (2007) the disadvantages of a fragmented ap-
proach include less potential for package deals, 
lack of fairness, incentives to engage in a race to 
the bottom and lack of transparency.
From an economist’s viewpoint, the disadvantag-
es dominate. Due to the characteristics of green-
house gas mitigation as a global public good, it is 
economically ideal to agree on emissions targets 
globally and to harness the cheapest mitigation op-
tions through market mechanisms. While simple 
marginal abatement cost curves as reported by Mc 
Kinsey need to be treated with caution (see Ekins 
et al. (2011), and the dynamic effects of mitigation 
policies need to be considered when comparing 
measures, experience from the Clean Development 
Mechanism has shown that it was able to mobilize a 
significant volume of low-cost reductions, but also 
higher cost ones (Castro 2011). The effect of frag-
mentation will be that overall emissions mitigation 
effort will be lower than required by the 2°C target 
acknowledged both in the Copenhagen and Cancun 
agreements (Kartha and Erickson 2011 summarize 
all relevant studies and conclude that the tempera-
ture rise would be in the interval 2.5°C to 5°C) . This 
is even acknowledged by realists, Carraro and Mas-
setti (2010) propose wryly to use 50 billion $ to buy 
mitigation in developing countries in order to close 
the effort gap. They do not realize that under a 
fragmented approach, there is no incentive for any 
country to spend huge sums on mitigation abroad. 
A comparison of modelling studies show that any 
fragmentation of mitigation action will unequivo-
cally lead to mitigation cost increases (Hof et al., 
2009). This is the case in any configuration of mar-
ginal costs. In a fragmented world, carbon prices 
will differ and even if there is “linking” of different 
jurisdictions (Flachsland et al. 2009), transaction 
costs will occur. Further negative effects are car-
bon leakage, i.e. the increase of emissions outside 
a group of countries that mitigates emissions due 
to the reduction of fossil fuel prices caused by the 
mitigation action (Sinn 2008). Fragmentation of 
market mechanisms will deter financial institu-
tions which need a minimum turnover and stabil-
ity to enter a market. In a fragmented market, sell-
ers of credits will be at the mercy of each single, 
unique buyer for specific types of credit while cur-
rently, international competition protects sellers 
against overly greedy buyers.  While some buyers 
would look for high-quality credits, as done by the 
EU today, there would probably be a “race to the 
bottom” in order to minimize costs of complying 
with the pledge.
How does a fragmented climate policy 
world look like?
The key characteristics of the centralized world 
of the Kyoto Protocol regime and their counter-
parts under a fragmented regime are shown in 
Box 1.
Often, a fragmented system is seen as equal to a 
“pledge and review” system, which was first pro-
posed by Japan in the early 1990s and has resurfaced 
from time to time. However, the review element still 
needs to be based on some common ground, which 
would lack in a fully fragmented system.
A full fragmentation would mean that all countries 
define their climate policy unilaterally. While even 
in the bleakest scenario, the UNFCCC would persist, 
it would uniquely provide rules for reporting of na-
tional greenhouse gas inventories. So some degree 
Fragmentation of mitigation action will 
unequivocally lead to mitigation cost 
increases.
16 
of ex post evaluation of actual climate policy suc-
cesses would be possible, at least for the Annex I 
countries. However, for developing countries, this 
evaluation would become difficult as the frequen-
cy of reports is not specified in the UNFCCC. 
The actual post-2012 future may settle on a “mid-
dle ground” between a centralized and a fully 
fragmented system (Prag et al. 2011, p. 8). While 
it retains some features of centralization that are 
commonly seen as useful – Prag et al. (2011) would 
include common accounting rules, tracking of in-
ternational transactions and common principles 
for new market mechanisms - other elements are 
fragmented. This would entail the risk that in a 
fragmented system one mitigation activity could 
be counted in several systems. A reduction might 
be acknowledged as an offset and at the same time 
credited towards a national pledge. This would 
become particularly relevant if some mechanisms 
credit policies whereas in the same jurisdiction 
project-based mechanisms continue to exist. It is 
clear that transaction costs of checking for double 
counting might be substantial.
Even with the UNFCCC negotiations formally still 
aiming at a relatively centralized system, de facto 
fragmentation is in full swing. The EU, which has 
hitherto formed the backbone of the global carbon 
market with its domestic emission trading scheme 
(EU ETS) accepting credits from the project-based 
Kyoto Mechanisms without serious constraints, is 
no longer willing to play this role. Already in the 
legislation agreed in 2009, the import limits for 
Kyoto credits have been reduced massively for the 
third EU ETS phase 2013-2020. Moreover, in the ab-
sence of an international agreement, Certified Emis-
sion Reductions (CERs) from Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) projects can only be imported 
if they come from projects located in Least Devel-
oped Countries or from projects that have already 
been registered before 2013. The latest restriction, 
announced in November 2010, was the prohibition 
of CER imports from CDM projects reducing the 
industrial gases HFC-23, and N2O from production 
of adipic acid, which will enter into force in April 
2013. CERs from such projects currently make up 
the lion’s share of all CDM credits. The EU has made 
it very clear that it sees the Kyoto Mechanisms as 
Box 1: Key differences between a centralized and a fragmented climate policy regime
Centralized world
-  legally binding commitments (absolute) 
-  common emissions units (same global warming 
potentials) 
-  common inventory guidelines (based on IPCC 
Good Practice) 
-  a UNFCCC-administered registry linking national 
registries
-  centrally defined market mechanisms 
-  central regulatory oversight 
- transparency 
Fragmented world
-  unilateral pledges (absolute or intensity-based, 
partially qualitative)
-  unilaterally defined emissions units (different 
global warming potentials)
-  unilateral inventory guidelines (national ap-
proach)
-  national registries 
- bilateral mechanisms 
- unilateral rules
- opaqueness
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a bargaining tool in the climate negotiations. It has 
been actively pushing for sectoral mechanisms to 
replace the CDM. Moreover, the EU’s import regula-
tions for the EU ETS allow multi-country agreements 
negotiated as per the EU’s interests. 
The US, which did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
and thus have been the vanguard of fragmentation 
proactively undermined the idea of a global carbon 
market. While the bills that failed to pass Congress 
in 2009 embraced the principle of international 
offsets, it remained always clear that these offsets 
would have to obey domestically defined regula-
tions. This was due to a deep mistrust of the CDM 
(see e.g. US Government Accountability Office 2008) 
fostered by an awkward coalition of supporters 
of environmental integrity and opponents of any 
monetary transfers abroad generated by climate 
policy. Offset mechanisms are also seen as a way to 
subsidize competitors of US industry in advanced 
developing countries; thus avoided deforestation 
initiatives were preferred compared to industrial 
projects.
Even within the US, fragmentation is rampant, with 
two regional emission trading schemes (the Region-
al Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI, in the Northeast 
and the Western Climate Initiative essentially trig-
gered by the Californian emissions trading proposal 
under the bill “AB 32”). Each of these schemes has 
different rules for project-based offsets. California 
has set an offset limit of 8%; offsets may only come 
from projects in the US, Canada and Mexico under 
rules approved by the Air Resources Board. So far, 
only a limited number of project types has been ac-
cepted. Moreover, sectoral credits might be allowed.
In 2010, Japan introduced the idea of a bilateral 
mechanism and quickly embarked in filling it with 
life. A budget of 77.5 million $ was allocated to 
promote the concept in 2010 and 2011. Both the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the 
Ministry of Environment are lavishly funding fea-
sibility studies for pilot projects, of which 59 have 
been started to date. Most of the studies are done in 
South East Asia and relate to technologies either not 
eligible under the CDM (e.g. a nuclear power plant in 
Vietnam) or suffering from additionality problems. 
Japanese industry strongly supports the bilateral 
approach as it was put off by the high regulatory in-
tensity of the CDM process and now hopes for easily 
accessible export subsidies for Japanese technolo-
gies. Access to feasibility study subsidies is limited 
to Japanese firms. Agreements with several govern-
ments to award and recognize bilateral credits are 
under negotiation. The credits are to be counted to-
wards the Japanese Copenhagen pledge. To date, no 
baseline, monitoring and verification methodologies 
have been published. The pilot projects shall how-
ever assess such methodologies.
The current status of fragmentation of carbon mar-
kets for the time after 2012 is shown in Figure 1 
below, showing the wide range of emissions trading 
systems and project-based offset mechanisms. 
Below, I discuss which parameters of project-based 
mechanisms and emissions trading systems can be 
influenced by fragmentation.
Differentiation of project-based  
mechanisms
The different parameters of project-based market 
mechanisms that can be influenced by fragmenta-
tion are as follows:
a) Baseline and additionality determination
b) Project types and sector coverage
Even with the UNFCCC negotiations for-
mally still aiming at a relatively centralized 
system, de facto fragmentation is in full 
swing.
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c) Duration of crediting period
d)  Validation process, monitoring, reporting and 
verification
e) Sustainability criteria
Positions of different countries and regional 
groups influencing their acceptance of offset cred-
its in a fragmented world will be discussed below.
Baseline and additionality
Both baseline and additionality determination of 
mitigation projects are crucial elements of any off-
set mechanism and thus have been severely con-
tested between business and environmental lobby 
groups. Normally, rules to set baselines are not 
identical with additionality determination rules 
but for many project types they are based on simi-
lar principles. The definition of the baseline is usu-
ally done by applying methodologies which have 
been accepted by the regulatory authorities.
Additionality is seen as important by key players 
in international negotiations. For example the EU 
has consistently emphasized strict additionality 
determination based on investment tests or tough 
technology benchmarks. Due to the strong domes-
tic opposition against offset mechanisms men-
tioned above the US is arguing on the one hand for 
a robust additionality test to avoid the impression 
that US money flows abroad for the purchase of 
hot air. On the other hand US industry has always 
been interested in simple access to cheap credits 
and thus is not really interested in a limitation due 
to a strict additionality rule. In developing coun-
tries, views diverge. On the one hand Least Devel-
oped Countries and the AOSIS group which do not 
have a large potential of non-additional emission 
reductions due to the absence of industry are in 
favour of strong additionality to achieve real miti-
gation of greenhouse gases. On the other hand 
heavily industrialized CDM players like China and 
India see additionality as an obstacle to maximize 
emission credit generation and exports and thus 
support a lenient interpretation of additionality. 
Regarding baseline determination similar chal-
lenges appear. A stringent baseline enhances envi-
EU ETS 
WCI 
(2013) RGGI
PRChina
(2013?)
NSW
NZ ETS 
National ETS
Sub-national ETS
Tokyo
Korea
(2015?)
CDM projects
CDM projects 
accepted in the EU
Taiwan
(200x?)
Projects under Japanese 
bilateral mechanism
Figure 1: Ongoing carbon market fragmentation – current status for post-2012
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ronmental integrity by leading to higher emission 
reductions while lowering the profitability of pro-
jects and increasing the costs of the investor coun-
try to reach its pledges. Thus the investor country 
might try to keep the baseline as loose and flexible 
as possible in a fragmented world. 
Countries interested in environmental integrity will 
ask for accurate and complete datasets for base-
line determination, while host countries and less 
quality-oriented buyers will go for simple default 
parameters. The pressure to reduce costs of base-
line setting will be high; eventually the supporters 
of environmental integrity might settle for highly 
conservative default factors. 
Project type and sector coverage
Investor countries will define eligible technologies 
in such a way that interests of its industries are sat-
isfied. Thus technologies that are applied by com-
petitors located in developing countries will not 
be eligible (see the US position discussed above), 
whereas technology exports not leading to direct 
competition will be favoured (see the Japanese ap-
proach to the bilateral mechanism).
Duration of crediting periods
In terms of environmental integrity, overall global 
emission reductions and project profitability, the 
characteristics of the crediting period within an off-
set system are a decisive factor as they directly af-
fect the number of credits which can be generated 
under the scheme. The start of the crediting period 
can be determined in very different ways. While the 
CDM is very conservative inasmuch the registration 
date determines the start date, other mechanisms 
may apply the starting date of the project or the 
date of third party validation, both of which would 
lead to an earlier inflow of credits.
The duration of the crediting period has major im-
pacts on the overall delivery volume of offsets. The 
CDM allows a maximum of 21 years for credit gen-
eration, split up in three periods of 7 years, whereas 
forestry projects can receive credits for 60 years. If 
one imagines that the whole lifetime of large power 
generation units like nuclear power plants or ultra-
super critical coal power plants would be eligible 
for crediting, the overall amount of offsets would 
be increased tremendously compared to the CDM. 
Longer crediting periods also increase the unwill-
ingness to change policy regime characteristics and 
thus tend to “fossilize” policies. The Japanese bilat-
eral mechanism, which has not defined any credit-
ing period, might be the first step into this direction.
Rules for updates and renewals of crediting periods 
can have important repercussions on credit vol-
umes. Stringent approaches require recalculation 
of the baseline and re-validation of additionality 
whereas lenient ones would just require continued 
existence of the project.
While the EU has shown a tendency to prevent re-
newal of crediting periods of project types that gen-
erate exceedingly high profits such as HFC-23, in-
ternationally lenient approaches to crediting period 
duration and renewal have not really spread to date. 
Validation process, monitoring, reporting and ver-
ification
A validation process requires an independent audi-
tor. A project could be admitted to a market mecha-
nism by simple production of a validation report of 
a certification company accredited under domestic 
law. The CDM goes beyond that inasmuch regula-
tors scrutinize validation reports and frequently 
ask for revisions. Moreover, regulators accredit vali-
The pressure to reduce costs of baseline 
setting will be high; eventually the support-
ers of environmental integrity might settle 
for highly conservative default factors.
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dators on the basis of a careful process of checking 
organizational competence. Significant cost savings 
could be achieved by doing away with validation 
and just rubber-stamping project documentation.  
Furthermore it has to be defined whether it is com-
pulsory to publish project documentation ex ante. 
The CDM even requires to collect the opinion of 
the potentially affected local population, e.g. by 
conducting a stakeholder meeting. Publication of 
documents and stakeholder consultation is costly, 
but usually seen as critical for credibility of pro-
jects. The same applies to monitoring, reporting 
and verification. Reporting frequencies, contents of 
monitoring reports, verification requirements and 
responsibilities need to be clarified. Should the veri-
fication body be independent or is verification done 
by the mechanism administrator? 
International acceptance of a “light” approach is not 
guaranteed, but experience is mixed. Some parties 
do not require independent validation for domestic 
offset systems (e.g. Canada ). Advanced developing 
countries have been extremely reluctant to allow 
independent verification. On the other hand trans-
parency of reporting monitoring results is generally 
supported, especially by the US. 
Sustainability criteria
In the CDM the host country’s DNA has the exclu-
sive right to define a set of sustainability criteria 
that projects have to fulfil. In case of a negative out-
come of the sustainability assessment projects can 
be rejected. This possibility reflects states’ sover-
eignty, but is applied rarely. Under fragmented mar-
kets, both countries involved in a transaction would 
have first to see a need for assessing sustainability 
benefits and then agree who defines and evaluates 
the criteria. Either it will be the responsibility of the 
host country as in the current CDM, or the investor 
claims that right for itself. A third approach would 
be the joint definition of criteria and a joint evalua-
tion body. 
Differentiation of emissions trading 
systems
For emissions trading systems, the key parameters 
are 
a) Characteristics of targets
b) Coverage
c) Allocation processes
d) Openness
Characteristics of targets
Under the Kyoto Protocol, targets are legally bind-
ing and thus generate demand for trading units. 
Targets can be set on different jurisdictional levels 
and “cascade” downwards from the international 
to the national and subnational level – the Kyoto 
target triggered the introduction of the EU ETS. In 
a fragmented climate policy world, the incentive to 
set legally binding targets will be lower than in the 
Kyoto world. Types of targets would also be differ-
entiated. The currently prevalent absolute targets 
would most likely be substituted by much less “bit-
ing” intensity targets, especially in advanced devel-
oping countries.
Coverage
The degree of coverage is akin to project type eligi-
bility for project-based mechanisms. An upstream 
system where allowances are surrendered by fossil 
fuel producers and importers can cover the entire 
economy. In a downstream system, coverage is usu-
ally limited to large sources in order to keep trans-
action cost at a manageable level. In a fragmented 
world, the latter system is more likely as it allows 
to exempt critical sectors. For example, in Australia 
and New Zealand key sectors prevented coverage 
In a fragmented climate policy world, the 
incentive to set legally binding targets will 
be lower than in the Kyoto world.
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in proposed emission trading systems arguing that 
their competitors were not covered by any climate 
policy instrument. Likewise, industries in the EU 
were able to prevent a replacement of free alloca-
tion by auctioning in the phase 2013-2020 by ar-
guing that a critical loss of competitiveness would 
ensue. Fragmentation will also lead to attempts to 
reduce transaction costs of the systems.
Allocation processes
Allocation can range from pure grandfathering to 
full auctioning of allowances. Fragmentation will 
make a grandfathering approach attractive as auc-
tioning is seen to provide a competitive disadvan-
tage. The EU implementation of the rules to prevent 
competitive distortions would certainly have led to 
less exemptions if Copenhagen had brought a cen-
tralized regime for post-2012.
Openness
In a centralized climate policy world, openness is 
favourable as it allows access to UNFCCC regulated 
credits and thus cost reduction with only a limited 
reduction in credibility. The fragmented world will 
reward exclusive relations between symbiotic part-
ners and discount openness. Openness reduces the 
degree of control over prices and quantities. Price 
caps and floors are a huge obstacle to openness as 
they might lead to “contamination” of other trading 
schemes in case the caps are reached. 
The voluntary carbon market  
– laboratory of fragmentation
We already have a fragmented world in an impor-
tant segment of the carbon markets – the voluntary 
market. In the decade of its existence, several key 
lessons have been learned. None of these is particu-
larly encouraging.
Lack of transparency
The voluntary market is highly non-transparent. 
Only specialists have a good overview of the details 
of rule differences. While some institutions provide 
an evaluation of the market segments (the best is 
the annual report on the state of voluntary mar-
kets, for the most recent edition see Peters-Stanley 
et al. 2011), there is no institution providing real-
time information. This is a massive contrast to the 
mandatory market systems where high liquidity and 
standardized contracts lead to real-time publication 
of prices free of charge. 
Wild swings in demand
Right from its inception, the voluntary market has 
been a buyer’s market. Turnover of the voluntary 
market is dependent on the whims of the demand 
side and credit suppliers have to discover “what 
turns the markets on or off” (Peters-Stanley et al. 
2011, p. iii). Whole market segments are turned off 
if the political appetite for greenhouse gas reduc-
tions slackens as seen in the US in 2009-10. This 
shows that a large share of the demand for volun-
tary credits was actually due to the hope to acquire 
an offset that could eventually be used for compli-
ance purposes at rock-bottom prices. Many players 
in the voluntary markets have also tried to market 
those segments that were ineligible in the compli-
ance market, such as forest protection. Generally, 
marketing plays a much larger role than in the com-
pliance market, leading to waste of resources and 
a tendency to focus on simple messages. Despite a 
decade of efforts, overall, annual turnover of the en-
tire voluntary market has remained below ¾ billion 
$, i.e. less than 1% of the compliance markets. Even 
if one only counts primary transactions of offsets 
from the Kyoto Mechanisms, the voluntary market 
never reached more than a quarter of the volume of 
the compliance market. 
Proliferation of institutions with similar tasks
Registry and verification systems compete with 
each other, increasing transaction costs. 15 reg-
istries are competing, most of which are located 
in the US. Divergence of standards is likely as 
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standard providers try to find stable niches. For 
example, the Gold Standard with a highly elabo-
rate stakeholder consultation procedure caters for 
the buyers who value development benefits highly, 
whereas the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) caters 
for those who want to get a “no-frills” credit. Pe-
ters-Stanley et al. (2011, p. vi) list 21 verification 
standards, twelve of which have a market share of 
1% or less. Some offset providers combine several 
standards, particularly in the forestry sector.
Wide divergence of credit prices reduces efficiency
Prices per emissions credit have a range of sev-
eral orders of magnitude depending on the ap-
peal of the credit. The difference is large both 
between project types as well as between differ-
ent projects of the same type. This clearly does 
not lead to an efficient mitigation outcome, as 
should be achieved by a market mechanism. With 
the exception of forest protection, there is an in-
verse relationship between the typical size of a 
project and its chance to achieve a high price.
Figure 2: Price lottery on the voluntary market ($)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
So
lar
Ag
rof
ore
str
y
Fo
res
t m
an
ag
em
en
t
Ge
oth
erm
al
Bio
ma
ss
Wi
nd
En
erg
y e
ffic
ien
cy
La
nd
fill 
ga
s
Fo
res
t p
rot
ec
tio
n
Hy
dro
 riv
er
High
Low
Average
Data source: Peters-Stanley et al. (2011: 20).
Doubtful environmental integrity 
Environmental integrity of voluntary offsets is 
very variable. While there is a distinct “high end” 
of the market catered for by the Gold Standard, 
many voluntary projects have a distinctively lax 
approach to additionality. Unsurprisingly, fre-
quently projects rejected under the CDM are ac-
cessing the voluntary market.
Possible futures of market mechanisms 
in a fragmented climate policy world
An apt analogy of the current situation in global 
climate policy is the eve of the great depression in 
the 1930s. Then, the gold standard currency sys-
tem was still working, albeit with challenges cre-
ated by protectionist tendencies of countries in 
the post-war period. Nobody did envisage how the 
currency world would look like just five years later 
– impoverished and fragmented, with countries in-
dulging in “beggar my neighbour “ policies. If we 
do not engage in a last minute attempt to save a 
global climate policy approach, we will similarly 
look back in a nostalgic fashion to the “good old 
days” of an integrated carbon market with a single 
currency, the CER.
Fragmented carbon market mechanisms will lead 
to a coexistence of project-based mechanisms, 
sectoral crediting and crediting of policies. Within 
the universe of project-based mechanisms, there 
will be different eligible project types, different 
baseline methodologies, different monitoring 
procedures and different degrees of verification, 
all leading to different degrees of environmental 
integrity. We will se a patchwork of partially over-
lapping approaches. Buyers will try to minimize 
costs of credits whose environmental integrity is 
sufficiently high to dispel doubts in the general 
population, as well as in the eyes of the interna-
tional community whereas sellers will want to 
maximize revenues. Given that the demand will 
be rather weak, a buyer’s market can be expected. 
As the voluntary market shows, there 
might be a small share of very high 
quality mechanisms, whereas bulk 
transactions would be done in a “no 
frills” way.
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One key criterion that is consistent among buy-
ers and sellers is low transaction cost. The avail-
ability of cheap credits from hitherto ineligible 
project types is also supported by both sellers 
and buyers, unless the environmental integrity of 
those credits is perceived to be low. Furthermore, 
both sellers and buyers are interested in diffusion 
of advanced technology, unless transfer of this 
technology leads to an increase of competitive 
pressure on industries from the investor country. 
As the voluntary market shows, there might be 
a small share of very high quality mechanisms, 
whereas bulk transactions would be done in a “no 
frills” way.
Of course, fragmentation of carbon markets will 
generate some winners – politicians unwilling to 
underwrite expenses for serious national mitiga-
tion strategies, industry lobbyists, sovereignty 
enthusiasts, contract lawyers, highly specialized 
consultants like my firm Perspectives, speculators 
and arbitrageurs. The great loser will be the global 
climate.
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